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I. INTRODUCTION
A scholar once said that "[a]rbitration proceeds in the shadow of gov-
ernment power at several stages."' Lately, this has become an understatement.
Today, when referring to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the
United States under the New York Convention, it would be fairer to say that
arbitration proceeds not in the shadow of governmental power, but rather at the
mercy of judicial parochialism.
In a recent opinion, Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC Novokuznetsky
Aluminum Factory,3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that,
in order to enforce a foreign arbitral award against assets present in its jurisdic-
B.A., Georgetown University, 2001; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2004.
William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 75, 98
(2002).
2 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
3 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002).
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tion, the subject property must be related to the underlying cause of action.4
Soon thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Glencore
Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co.5 reasoned the opposite:
relatedness to the cause of action is not necessary for a court to enforce an
award against assets present in the forum.6 Other courts, including the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have followed the rationale behind the
latter holding and rejected that of the former.7 The split can be summarized as a
division on the question of whether the assets targeted in an enforcement action
must be the subject of (or related to) the underlying cause of action.8
Adding to the controversy, those U.S. state courts that have addressed
the issue have held that foreign judgments may be enforced within their jurisdic-
tion based on the presence of assets alone. 9 These state courts, unlike the Fourth
4 Id. at 211 ("[T]he mere presence of seized property in Maryland provides no basis for as-
serting jurisdiction when there is no relationship between the property and the action .... "). A
few months after the Fourth Circuit decided Base Metal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit dodged this issue. In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit declined to address whether
the presence of assets in a jurisdiction is enough to enforce a foreign arbitral award because the
moving party had not advanced this theory in the lower court. Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC
Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, No. 01-3348, 2002 WL 31002609, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 5,
2002).
5 284 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
6 Id. at 1127 ("Considerable authority supports [the] position that [a foreign arbitral award]
can [be] enforce[d] [against an award debtor's] property in the forum even if that property has no
relationship to the underlying controversy between the parties.").
7 See, e.g., Dardana Ltd. v. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F.3d 202, 206-08 (2d Cir. 2003); CME
Media Enters. B.V. v. Zelezny, No. 01 Civ. 1733(DC), 2001 WL 1035138, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 2001).
8 A sub-issue that lurks in the background is whether the presence of assets in the enforcing
jurisdiction is even necessary before a court may confirm an award. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia raised this issue when it noted in Creighton Ltd v. Government of
Qatar that:
It is implausible that a defendant in Connecticut who had agreed to arbitrate
all disputes in New York, and thereby implicitly waived any objection to per-
sonal jurisdiction in a suit brought in New York to enforce the resulting arbi-
tral award, also waived its objection to personal jurisdiction in such an action
brought in California merely because the full faith and credit clause would
make a valid New York judgment enforceable in the courts of California.
181 F.3d 118, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For a more in-depth discussion of this issue see infra Part VL
9 See Joseph E. Neuhaus, Current Issues in the Enforcement of International Arbitration
Awards, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 29 & n.29 (2004) (citing Huggins v. Deinhard, 654
P.2d 32, 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 22-23 (Conn. 1984);
Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Williamson v. Williamson, 275
S.E.2d 42, 44-45 (Ga. 1981)).
Although federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all proceedings under the New
York Convention regardless of the amount in controversy, see 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2000), state law
governs recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See also id. § 205 (providing for
removal of "an action or proceeding pending in a State court" that "relates to an arbitration agree-
ment or award falling under the [New York] Convention").
[Vol. 109
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Circuit, have not required the assets to be related to the cause of action. Of
course, in the context of arbitral awards, these opinions raise a more basic ques-
tion: should a foreign judgment receive more favorable treatment in U.S. state
courts than foreign arbitral awards in U.S. federal courts?
As it is, the aforementioned circuit court opinions have also unearthed a
major question posed by many commentators and academics in the years since
the Supreme Court's landmark decision Shaffer v. Heitner.10 In Shaffer, the
Court held that all assertions of jurisdiction must comply with the minimum
contacts test "set forth in International Shoe [Co. v. Washington]" and its prog-
eny."' 12 Yet, as a well-known scholar observed merely a year after the Shaffer
opinion:
The crucial question . is whether [the] limited exposure [of
quasi in rem subtype II], as contrasted with the general expo-
sure achieved by in personam rules, makes the exercise of in
rem jurisdiction reasonable in circumstances in which assertion
of in personam jurisdiction would go too far. Only the answer
to this question can resolve whether in rem rules have a con-
tinuing utility. 1
3
That is, the Shaffer Court did not explicitly state whether the minimum contacts
test was at all influenced by the nature and procedural posture of a proceeding.
In light of these issues, this article will address two basic points. First,
it will propose that foreign arbitral awards should be treated no differently than
foreign judgments. A contrary approach could undermine the theory behind the
New York Convention: 14 that it "makes it far easier to enforce arbitral awards
This "split" between state and federal courts accentuates the awkwardness of not having a unified
federal standard to deal with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral
awards. See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4473 (2d ed. 2002) ("It is intrinsically awkward to confront foreign
judgments with the potentially divergent law of fifty states and federal courts, and recognition of
foreign judgments at least touches concerns of foreign relations in which the national government
has paramount interests.").
10 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
11 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
13 Hans Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43
BROOK. L. REV. 600, 614 (1977); see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 77 (1978) (noting that Shaffer's "majority opinion implied that the
Court would still permit attachment for post-judgment enforcement purposes").
14 Albert Jan van den Berg, Recent Enforcement Problems under the New York and ICSID
Conventions, 5 ARB. INT'L 2, 2 (1989) ("The effectiveness of international arbitration depends
ultimately on... whether the arbitral award can be enforced against the losing party.").
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than it is to enforce [foreign] judgments."1 5 Second, this Article will posit that
the presence of assets alone, however unrelated to the underlying cause of action
they may be, should be enough to meet the minimum contacts test during a post-
award proceeding. 16 As such, the Article will argue that "[p]roceedings to en-
force a foreign arbitration award against [any] assets located in [the enforcing
forum's] jurisdiction should not require the same showing of personal jurisdic-
tion to satisfy due process as would a complaint seeking determination of the
merits of the controversy, because the merits have already been determined."'
17
In the course of doing so, Section II of this piece gives an overall pic-
ture of the New York Convention and its goals. Of special importance to this
section is the discussion of "floating" awards and how this conceptualization of
arbitral awards as hovering over the losing party's assets furthers the goals of
the New York Convention. Section 1I then discusses the limits that U.S. consti-
tutional doctrine and jurisprudence place on the enforcement of arbitral awards
subject to the New York Convention.
Section IV discusses the difference between personal and quasi in rem
jurisdiction while also highlighting the difference between pre- and post- judg-
ment proceedings. It is in this context that the piece addresses the Supreme
Court's holding in Shaffer, with Shaffer's footnote 36 taking center stage. Sec-
tion IV also notes that the Supreme Court understood the minimum contacts test
to be a flexible standard-different types of proceedings call for different appli-
cation of the test. Section V then argues that this flexible approach should apply
with equal force to arbitral awards as it does to domestic and foreign court
judgments.
Section VI explains why a more flexible approach to the minimum con-
tacts test during post-judgment proceedings is adequate to protect a party's due
process rights. In so doing, it concludes that relatedness to the cause of action is
a requirement that is appropriate in pre-judgment proceedings but that need not
be bootstrapped onto post-judgment proceedings.
I. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND "FLOATING" AWARDS
Most arbitral awards are never subject to the state or judicial action of
any given jurisdiction. Having agreed to arbitrate their claims (and, conse-
quently, to respect the decision of the arbitral tribunal), most losing parties vol-
untarily comply with the terms and conditions of an arbitral award. 18 Moreover,
even if the winning party is faced with a recalcitrant loser and judicial action is
is Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 18
INT'L ARB. L. REv. 198, 198 (1998).
16 The phrase "post-judgment/award proceeding(s)" is used in this article to refer to actions to
enforce domestic judgments, foreign judgments, or foreign arbitral awards.
17 Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2002).
Is GEORGE GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 59 (2d ed. 1983).
[Vol. 109
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required, the winning party may not have to travel far to seek redress. An award
may be confirmed and enforced in the jurisdiction where it was rendered in
much the same manner as a local judgment would be. 19
Matters could be a bit more difficult when a losing party refuses to pay,
and none of the losing party's assets are located in the jurisdiction where the
award was rendered. In that case, the winning party may have no other option
but to go search for those assets in whatever other jurisdictions they might be
found. 20 The New York Convention is one of the mechanisms available to a
winning party, which the party may use to enforce a valid arbitral award in ju-
risdictions other than the one where it was rendered. Described as the most sig-
nificant international commercial arbitration agreement currently in place,2' the
success of the New York Convention lies primarily in its practicality and its
convenience.
The relevance of the New York Convention, however, is better under-
stood when discussed in its historical context. Under the Geneva Convention,22
the predecessor to the New York Convention, the winning party in an arbitration
that wished to enforce the award outside of the situs of the arbitration had to
pursue two separate judicial proceedings: the first in the forum country, to con-
firm the award, and the second in the foreign jurisdiction, to enforce the
award.23 Double exequatur, as this procedural requirement is known, "was an
unnecessary time-consuming hurdle.., and greatly limited [the Geneva Con-
vention's] utility." 24
The New York Convention eliminated the requirement of double ex-
equatur. Under the New York Convention, there is no need to have the award
confirmed in the court of the forum in which it was rendered. Indeed, the New
York Convention simplified the process by making arbitral awards enforceable
19 Compare footnotes 84-86 and accompanying text infra (describing how a domestic judg-
ment is enforced), with footnote 31 infra (numbering the challenges that may be raised in a pro-
ceeding brought to enforce a foreign arbitral award subject to the New York Convention).
20 Marc J. Goldstein & Andrea K. Bjorklund, International Commercial Dispute Resolution,
36 IrNr'L LAW. 401, 406-407 (2002) ("Enforcement of an award in the domiciliary state of the
award debtor may be difficult for many reasons, and so the award creditor may be inclined to seek
enforcement in a pro-enforcement jurisdiction where.., the award debtor may... have assets
subject to attachment ... ").
21 See, e.g., ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 1 (1981) (describing the New York Convention
as the "most important convention of modem times in the field of international commercial arbi-
tration").
22 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
23 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 21, at 7.
24 Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22 (2d Cir.
1997) (citations omitted); see also Jan Paulson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational
Commercial Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 212 (1981) (noting that having to seek enforce-
ment of an award first in the forum where it was rendered was unduly cumbersome).
2006]
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immediately in all countries that are signatories to the Convention.25 As one of
the leading experts in the field explained:
[O]ne of the most important features of an award in an interna-
tional commercial arbitration is that it should be readily trans-
portable. It must be capable of being taken from the state in
which it was made, under one system of law, to other states in
which it is able to qualify for recognition and enforcement, un-
der different systems of law. To render an award effective,
means must be available internationally and not simply in the
country in which the award is made.26
That is precisely what the New York Convention accomplished. Quite simply,
it "liberalized procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards."2 7 Under the
New York Convention, an arbitral award is a "floating" award, ready to strike
like lighting in any jurisdiction where the losing party has assets.28
This simple process provides certainty to parties when they are negotiat-
ing an international commercial agreement. The arbitration clause, as a practi-
cal matter, serves as a choice of forum clause which avoids the problem of not
knowing where a suit could be brought by one contracting party against the
other. In so doing, the process facilitates international business transactions.29
Even the Supreme Court noted, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., that "'much
uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise .. if
jurisdiction were left to any place (where personal or in rem jurisdiction might
25 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) (explaining that the New York
Convention was designed "to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitra-
tion agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which... arbitral awards
are enforced .... ").
26 ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 438-439 (2004).
27 Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 22 (quoting Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Enforcing the Awards against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 867, 878
(1996)).
28 There is a caveat to this statement. Article 1(3) of the New York Convention allows states
to limit their commitment to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards to those rendered in the
territory of another contracting state. See New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(3). The
United States requires that the award be made in the territory of a contracting state. 9 U.S.C. §
201 (2000).
29 Indeed, in ratifying the New York Convention, Congress was fully aware that it would
facilitate international commercial dispute-resolution and, consequently, aid U.S. companies'
expansion into global markets. See S. Rep. No. 91-702, at 3 (1970) ("[The bill] will serve the best
interests of Americans doing business abroad by encouraging them to submit their commercial
disputes to impartial arbitration for awards which can be enforced in both U.S. and foreign
courts.").
[Vol. 109
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be established)."' 30 By that same token, after a full and fair proceeding in the
forum of their own choosing, the corresponding certainty of being able to hunt
down a debtor's assets wherever in the world they might be found is a winning
party's ideal scenario.
To be sure, the New York Convention does not give carte blanche to the
winning party to enforce an arbitral award without restrictions. Under the New
York Convention, a court may refuse to recognize a foreign arbitral award if the
losing party was "not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present [its] case."3'
Furthermore, and perhaps not surprisingly, arbitral rules often have a provision
addressing the parties' due process concerns. For example, Article 15(2) of the
International Chamber of Commerce provides that "[i]n all cases, the Arbitral
Tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and ensure that each party has a reason-
able opportunity to present its case., 32 Moreover, as the next section discusses,
there are other due process concerns that may limit the possibility of enforcing a
foreign arbitral award in the United States and, consequently, give new meaning
to the clich6 "so close, yet so far away."
30 417 U.S. at 518 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1971)). The
Court also noted that "[tihe elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a fo-
rum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and
contracting." Id. (quotation omitted); see also Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11-12 ("Not surprisingly,
foreign businessmen prefer.., to have disputes resolved in their own courts, but if that choice is
not available, then in a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter."). For a discussion of
the advantages, real or perceived, of international arbitration in cross-border transactions, see
Park, supra note 1, at 89-94.
31 New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V(l)(b). This ground for dismissal guarantees
that the parties' due process rights will not be violated. Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the
United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1067 (1961) (stating that Article V.1(b) incorporates basic
principles of due process).
Other grounds for dismissal are: (1) the parties to the arbitration agreement lacked capacity or the
agreement was not legally valid; (2) the award deals with a matter not submitted to arbitration or
beyond the scope of submission; (3) the arbitral authority or procedure was not agreed to by the
parties; or (4) the award was not yet binding or had been set aside or suspended in the enforce-
ment forum. New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. V(I). Enforcement may also be refused
if "[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration" or if "recogni-
tion or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [the signatory nation
where enforcement is sought]." Id. at art. V(2). These specified grounds for denial of enforcement
are exclusive. See, e.g., Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 23 (noting that judicial review of arbitral awards under
the New York Convention is "very limited.., in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of
arbitration, namely, settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation")
(quoting Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)).
32 Art. 15(2) of the International Chamber of Commerce Rules on International Commercial
Arbitration, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/ court/english/arbitration /pdf-documents/ rules
/rulesarb.english.pdf.
2006]
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III. ANCHORING THE FLOATING AWARD TO THE UNITED STATES
Although the New York Convention provides a liberal framework for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, it does not do so in a
vacuum. To the contrary, when the rubber meets the road, an arbitral award is
subject to the enforcing forum's procedures. 33 The New York Convention ex-
plicitly requires "[e]ach Contracting State [to] recognize arbitral awards as bind-
ing and [to] enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the terri-
tory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in [various
provisions of the Convention]."T
In the United States, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbi-
tral award is subject to the constitutional requirements of procedural due proc-
ess.35 This limitation is embedded in the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution, which provides that a "state [cannot] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... , This constitutional mandate
makes it clear that U.S. courts must exercise some restraint before enforcing a
foreign arbitral award. This section briefly discusses how the Due Process
Clause and a corresponding set of jurisdictional requirements may stand in the
way of an award's enforcement by requiring that it be anchored to "something"
or "someone" in the United States.
37
33 See New York Convention, supra note 2, at art. III.
34 Id.
35 Procedural due process refers to the set of procedures that a state or federal government
must follow before it can deprive a person of her life, liberty, or property. Common examples of
procedural due process issues are what kind of notice and what kind of hearing a person is entitled
to before the government can take a particular action. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 523-24 (2d ed. 2002).
36 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XI; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
541 (1985) ("mhe Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights - life, liberty, and
property - cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures."); Ins.
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("The require-
ment that a court have personal jurisdiction flows... from the Due Process Clause.").
The Fourteenth Amendment binds the states, and the Fifth Amendment binds the federal govern-
ment. As a general matter, the constitutional analysis that follows is one and the same for pro-
ceedings brought in state or federal courts because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt
state law as the federal law of territorial jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1) ("Service of
summons ... is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant.., who could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court
is located .. "). Moreover, given that many states' jurisdictional statutes expand the exercise of
jurisdiction to the constitutional limits, the minimum contacts inquiry boils down to whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process. See, e.g., Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v.
OJSC Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2002).
37 Although the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") grants federal courts the subject matter juris-
diction to hear actions to enforce arbitral awards, it does so only to the extent that is constitution-
ally permissible. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (allowing for confirmation of a foreign arbitral award
by application to any court "having jurisdiction"); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai
Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Interpreting the FAA to dispense with the
[Vol. 109
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The operative words in the constitutional hurdle that litigants have to
leap to get closer to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award are "minimum
contacts." This term is the constitutional formulation of a "test" 38 that finds its
basis in the two complementary and sometimes competing goals of the Due
Process Clause. As the Supreme Court itself noted:
The concept of minimum contacts . . . perform[s] two related,
but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
39
Put simply, the minimum contacts test requires that the defendant "have certain.
. contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '4
The minimum contacts test thus serves as a constitutional umbrella en-
compassing two tests: the "power" test and the "fairness," or "reasonableness,"
test. 41 On the one hand, the power test looks at the pre-litigation contacts with
the state and asks whether these contacts are the result of the defendant's pur-
poseful actions.42 On the other hand, the fairness test aims at determining
whether the "relationship between the defendant and the forum" makes it rea-
sonable to require the defendant to defend a particular suit brought in the fo-
jurisdictional requirements of Due Process in actions to confirm arbitral awards would raise clear
questions concerning the constitutionality of the statutes."); cf Ins. Corp. of Jr., 456 U.S. at 702
("The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individ-
ual liberty."); Gilson v. Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[A] statute cannot grant
personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it .... ).
38 This piece refers to "minimum contacts" not as a preliminary step in the constitutional
analysis, but as the conclusion of that analysis. However, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
suggested that the term "minimum contacts" means a "quantum of contacts." See ROBERT C.
CASAD & WILUAM M. RiCHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 147-48 (3d ed. 1998). Regard-
less of what is the "correct" interpretation or definition of the phrase, the analysis and overarching
principles described in this section remain the same.
39 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
40 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
41 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
42 Id. at 253 ("Where [must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tection of its laws."); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294-295 (noting that "[e]ven if the
defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience .. .; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient loca-
tion for the litigation[,]" there can be no jurisdiction without purposefully established contacts).
2006]
9
Díaz-Perosa: <em>Shaffer's</em> Footnote 36
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
rum.
4 3 These two sub-tests are cumulative; that is, "power must exist and its
exercise must not be unreasonable." 44
Another layer of constitutional analysis that affects the understanding
and application of the minimum contacts test is the distinction between general
and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate any
claim, including those claims that are not intimately related to the defendant's
contacts with the state, upon a showing that the defendant's contacts are of a
"continuous and systematic" nature.45 Specific jurisdiction allows a court to
adjudicate only those claims that are "related to" the defendant's contacts with
the state. As such, the court's power can be fairly exercised only to the extent
that it is used to address a cause of action that arises out of the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum, and those contacts cannot be random, fortuitous, or attenu-
ated.46 In short, the defendant's contacts with the forum must be "such that [it]
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.",
47
Perhaps the only clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court regarding
the minimum contacts test is its admission that the test "is not susceptible of
mechanical application., 48 If anything, it is more like a sliding scale, with gen-
eral and specific jurisdiction being the two opposite ends. 49 In other words, the
more contacts a defendant purposefully establishes with a given forum, the more
reasonable it is for a court in that forum to exert its power over that defendant.
(This is true even if the cause of action is not directly related to a defendant's
contacts with the state.) Similarly, the fewer contacts a defendant purposefully
establishes with a given forum, the less reasonable it is for a court in that forum
to exert its power over that defendant. In those circumstances, the minimum
contacts requirement dictates that a court may exercise only specific jurisdiction
over the defendant and adjudicate actions that arise out of those limited contacts
with the forum.
Determining what is a fair and reasonable exercise of judicial power in
light of a party's contacts with a state or the United States is no easy feat. 50 Yet,
43 World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 292 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
44 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 20 (1999);
CASAD & RicHMAN, supra note 38, at 138.
45 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1984).
46 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985).
47 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court found
that "the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there." Id.
48 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); see also Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at
477 ("These considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a
lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.").
49 CAsAD & RiCHMAN, supra note 38, at 163.
50 "[A]ny inquiry into 'fair play and substantial justice' necessarily requires determinations 'in
which few answers will be written in 'black and white. The greys are dominant and even among
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there are some factors that may guide litigants and courts in determining
whether a court may subject a party to its jurisdiction. These are: (a) the burden
on the defendant in litigating in the forum; (b) the forum state's interest in adju-
dicating the dispute; (c) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effec-
tive relief; (d) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of controversies; and (e) the several states' shared interest in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 51 "These considerations
sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of... contacts than would otherwise be required.,
52
Another factor that should serve as a framework to an analysis of these
considerations is the nature and procedural posture of an action. For example,
the minimum contacts test should take into account the difference between an
action brought to resolve a breach of contract dispute and an action to enforce a
judgment against assets located in the jurisdiction. Again, the idea of a sliding
scale comes to mind, with pre-judgment actions in one extreme and post-
judgment actions in the other. The sections that follow address why a more
flexible approach is warranted at the back-end of the process in an enforcement
proceeding.
IV. A FLEXIBLE AND REASONABLE APPROACH TO A MINIMUM CONTACTS
ANALYSIS
The past section showed that the minimum contacts test, although am-
biguous, is also flexible. To be sure, a court's jurisdictional power over a party
must always comply with the constitutional requirements set forth in the mini-
mum contacts test.53 This section, however, argues that the Court in Shaffer
understood that the difference between pre-judgment and post-judgment pro-
ceedings calls for different applications of this test. To do so, this section
briefly discusses the difference between in personam and quasi in rem actions.
A discussion of Shaffer and its footnote 36 serves as a backdrop to this discus-
sion.
At the root of the minimum contacts test's flexibility is its all-
inclusiveness; the minimum contacts test applies to all categories of jurisdic-
tion. 54 There are three categories of jurisdiction: one directed towards persons -in personam (or personal) jurisdiction - and two directed towards things - in
them the shades are innumerable."' Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486 n.29 (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S.
at 92).
51 Id. at 477 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
52 Id.
53 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
54 Id. at 211. But see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620-21 (1990) (noting that
Shaffer did not hold that "all bases of assertion of in personam jurisdiction ... must be treated
alike and subjected to the 'minimum contacts' analysis of International Shoe").
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rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.55 The practical difference between the three
categories of jurisdiction is that they describe diverging ways in which a court
may affect the interests or rights of a defendant. Whereas a court that has in
personam jurisdiction over a defendant may render a judgment imposing per-
sonal liability on that defendant, a court that has in rem or quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion can only bind the property before it.56 Logically, then, a defendant's expo-
sure to liability and a plaintiffs possibility of recovery are greater if a court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.57
Another key feature of in personam jurisdiction is that the resulting
judgment offers the winning party the possibility of interstate enforcement. A
valid in personam judgment rendered in any state of the United States is entitled
to full faith and credit in the courts of every sister state.58 The Supreme Court
said it best when it explained that "a debtor can[not] avoid paying his obligation
by removing his property to a State in which his creditor cannot obtain personal
jurisdiction over him. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the
valid in personam judgment of one State enforceable in other sister States., 59
In practice, what gives personal jurisdiction such a broad reach and vir-
tually unlimited enforcement possibilities is quasi in rem jurisdiction subtype II
or, as it is more commonly known, attachment jurisdiction. This category al-
lows a court to exert jurisdiction over a designated property and to render a
judgment that affects only the interests of particular individuals in such prop-
erty. 60 Attachment jurisdiction is therefore commonly used to either secure a
55 Categorization of an action is a vestige of a time in which the power test was king. See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Silberman, supra note 13, at 44-45 (explaining that the
theory behind the categories of jurisdiction was the "'power' theory of jurisdiction" which, in
turn, was based on two principles: "that 'every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover-
eignty over persons and property within its territory' and "that 'no tribunal established by [a
state] can extend process beyond [its] territory so as to subject either persons or property to its
decisions"') (quotation omitted).
56 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 38, at 179-80; CLERMONT, supra note 44, at 7-8.
57 Greater exposure to liability, however, does not mean that there are no limits as to what can
be adjudicated in an in personam action. The principles of general and specific jurisdiction, of
course, apply to in personam jurisdiction and help define - and narrow, as the case may be - the
cause of actions to which a defendant may be liable.
58 According to Article IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Although some commentators argue that Congress
has done little under its authority to implement the clause, see, e.g., ROBERT LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFuCrS LAW 215-16 (1986), it has nonetheless enacted a statute to that effect. See 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (2000).
59 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210; Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: New
York's Revival of a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1059, 1110 (1989-90)
("[T]he full faith and credit clause means that a judgment obtained in one jurisdiction where there
are no assets to satisfy the claim must be enforced by other jurisdictions where assets exist.")
(footnote omitted).
60 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199 & n.17.
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pre-existing claim over the subject property or, more importantly for our pur-
poses, to collect a debt based on a judgment rendered against the owner of the
property in a forum where that owner was subject to personal jurisdiction.61 To
summarize, "[t]he effect of a judgment in [an attachment jurisdiction] case is
limited to the property that supports jurisdiction; [it] does not impose a personal
liability on the property owner, since he is not before the court.
62
Attachment jurisdiction has a more troubling history than merely serv-
ing as a practical complement to in personam judgments. For a long time, quasi
in rem jurisdiction served as a substitute for in personam jurisdiction. This
practice can be traced back to U.S. colonial times.63 Back then, attachment ju-
risdiction allowed creditors to adjudicate claims against fleeing debtors by at-
taching the property that the debtor had left behind.64 In so doing, attachment
jurisdiction provided creditors with a forum in which to adjudicate their claims
against a debtor and a means, albeit limited to the value of the attached property,
with which to satisfy any resulting judgment.65 Otherwise, given that "huge
sections of the continent were underdeveloped, and transportation and commu-
nication among its far flung parts remained primitive," a creditor would have
been unable to collect on an absent debtor's debt.66
That practice changed after Shaffer. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that for a pre-judgment in rem action to be consistent with constitutional
limitations on state power, the attached property must be the subject of, or re-
lated to, the litigation. 67 Mr. Heitner, a shareholder of the Greyhound Corpora-
tion, had brought suit in Delaware against Mr. Shaffer, along with other mem-
bers of the board of directors, alleging that they had violated their duties to
Greyhound. According to Mr. Heitner, the board of directors caused the corpo-
61 Id.; CME Media Enters. B.V. v. Zelezny, No. 01 Civ. 1733(DC), 2001 WL 1035138, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2001) ("[Q]uasi in rem jurisdiction is used to attach property to collect a debt
based on a claim already adjudicated in a forum where there was personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.").
62 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199. Furthermore, unlike an in personam judgment, "a quasi in rem
judgment cannot be enforced by other jurisdictions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution." CME Media, 2001 WL 1035138, at *4.
63 Mushlin, supra note 59, at 1066.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1067.
67 The court ruled that, when "the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to
the plaintiff's cause of action," the mere presence of property within a particular state would not
be enough, by itself, to support jurisdiction. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209. Despite this clear pro-
nouncement, there is still disagreement as to whether in a pre-judgment proceeding the attached
property must be strictly related to the cause of action. Compare Unitech USA, Inc. v. Ponsoldt,
457 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding that property must be related to the cause of
action), and Cameron-Brown Co. v. Daves, 350 S.E.2d 111 (N.C. App. 1986) (same), with Feder
v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that property may be unrelated
to the cause of action), and Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 603 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. Miss.
1985) (same).
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ration to engage in actions that resulted in it being liable in an antitrust suit. The
alleged violations, however, took place in Oregon, and none of the board of
directors resided in Delaware. In fact, the directors had been "haled" into
Delaware courts based on their ownership of stock and stock options which,
according to local law were deemed to be "present" in Delaware. But, as the
Court noted, the "property [was] not the subject.., of th[e] litigation, nor [was]
the underlying cause of action related to the property., 68 Indeed, the property
was "completely unrelated to [the] cause of action .... [T]he only role played
by the property [was] to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into
court."
69
One of the primary concerns of the Shaffer Court was closing a gap in
the law: "if a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over [a] defendant would
violate the Constitution, . . . an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be
equally impermissible.' '70 As the Court understood it, Mr. Heitner could not
have sued Mr. Shaffer in Delaware for breach of fiduciary duties because Dela-
ware courts did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Clearly, Mr. Heitner
should not have been able to circumvent that constitutional limitation by claim-
ing jurisdiction over Mr. Shaffer's property. In practical terms, the result would
have been the same: Mr. Shaffer would have been forced to litigate in a jurisdic-
tion that otherwise did not have personal jurisdiction over him, and that conse-
quently would not have been able to entertain Mr. Heitner's claim in the first
place. The Court agreed that "[t]he phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing', is
a[n]. .. elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interest of persons in a
thing.',
71
Thus, at a pre-judgment stage, it matters little that the potential liability
of a defendant who has been haled into court in an in rem action would be lim-
72ited to the value of the property. According to the Shaffer Court, "[t]he fair-
ness of subjecting a defendant to [the jurisdiction of a court] does not depend on
the size of the claim being litigated., 73 Instead, it depends on "fair play and
substantial justice." And, in this context, fairness depends on the relationship
between the property and the cause of action. If, for example, the property is
related to the cause of action, as in an action where a party challenges a defen-
dant's ownership rights, then the exercise of jurisdiction would be proper be-
cause "the defendant's claim to [the] property located in the State would...
indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest., 74
68 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213.
69 Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 207 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Introductory Note
(1971)).
72 Id. at 207 n.23.
73 Id. (citations omitted).
74 Id. at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).
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The Supreme Court, however, had a very different view of what is
"fair" in post-judgment attachment actions and "greatly relaxed" the minimum
contacts requirement in such actions.75 At the endgame of litigation, once a
judgment has been rendered, the Shaffer Court considered it fair to allow a party
to satisfy the resulting debt by permitting attachment of any of the losing party's
property, regardless of its relationship to the underlying cause of action.76 That
is, in a post-judgment action, the Court embraced a "rear view mirror" approach
to the question of personal jurisdiction: Did the rendering court have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant? If so, then all that is needed in the enforcing
state is the presence of defendant's assets.77
Shaffer's footnote 36 is the Supreme Court's imprimatur of this practi-
cal relationship between in personam and attachment jurisdiction in post-
judgment actions. According to the Court,
[oInce it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would
seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that
debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not
that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of
the debt as an original matter.78
Thus, a state may enforce a sister state judgment even if the enforcing state does
not have personal jurisdiction over the debtor.79 As Professor Leflar said, "per-
75 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 n.14 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210-11 nn. 36-37).
76 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This is because "the formality
and procedural requisites for [a] hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests
involved .. " Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985) (quoting Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)). Indeed, Due Process "is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances .... [It] is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334 (1976) (citations omitted).
77 See Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Md. 1992) ("I do not,
however, read Shaffer as requiring the same minimum contacts for the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction as are required for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction."); cf Feder v. Turkish
Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding jurisdiction in a pre-judgment action even
though the attached property was unrelated to the cause of action because a defendant that places
property in the state "knowingly assume[s] some risk that the state will exercise its power over
[his] property or [his] person while there.").
78 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210-11 n.36.
79 See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 95-97 (1978) (holding that California's assertion
of personal jurisdiction over a New York resident defendant was unreasonable but noting that "a
New York court would clearly have personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] and, if a judgment
were entered by a New York court ... it could properly be enforced against him in both New
York and California"); see also Neuhaus, supra note 9, at 29; Lawrence W. Newman, Jurisdiction
to Enforce Foreign Judgments, 225 N.Y. L.J. 3 col. 1 (April 30, 2001) (noting that Shaffer's foot-
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sonal jurisdiction is not required in every state that has anything to do with the
enforcement of a judgment. '" 80
Even if in personam and attachment jurisdiction work hand-in-hand to
ensure that a party's victory is not empty, that should not give the impression
that anything goes. As suggested above, a major limitation to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is that a judgment must be recognized and enforced in another
forum only if the court that rendered the judgment had personal jurisdiction over
the parties.8' In other words, an in personam judgment that is rendered without
jurisdiction over the losing party is not entitled to another state's faith or
credit.82 Such a judgment is subject to collateral attack on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.83
In short, a valid in personam judgment rendered by a U.S. court is sub-
ject only to the enforcing state's bona fide procedural rules. 84 In this context
though, a winning party's concerns should be limited to properly complying
with purely administrative requirements that the enforcing state imposes.8 5
note 36 suggests that the standards and theoretical bases for jurisdiction to enforce a judgment
may be different than those at stake during a pre-judgment proceeding).
80 LEFLAR, supra note 58, at 235-36. Or, as the Supreme Court noted in Shaffer, "a State in
which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper proce-
dures, as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained
consistently with [the minimum contacts requirements]." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210 (footnote omit-
ted).
81 See Barkat Gems, Inc. v. Feldman, No. 84 Civ. 0659 (WCC), 1989 WL 34065, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1989).
82 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Compare New York Convention, supra note
2, at art. V(1)(b) (stating that enforcement of an award may be refused if "[t]he party against
whom the award is invoked was ... unable to present his case"), with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (noting that the "root requirement" of the Due Process
Clause is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any
significant property interest).
83 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ("A judgment
rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith
and credit elsewhere.") (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877)); RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 81 (1982).
84 Under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act ("Sister State Act"), the clerk of
the court in the enforcing state treats the sister state judgment in the same manner as a judgment
rendered by a court of the enforcing state. See UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT,
§ 1 et. seq, 13 U.L.A. 154 (1986); see also LEFLAR, supra note 58, at 217 ("A state is not bound to
set up, for suits on foreign judgments, judicial machinery which it does not provide for its own
causes of action.") (citing Anglo-Am. Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903)).
85 For example in New Jersey, under its Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:49A-25 to -33 (2000), the judgment of a sister state court "has the same effect
and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or stay-
ing as a judgment of a Superior Court of this State and may be enforced in the same manner."
Enron (Thrace) Exploration & Prod. BV & ECT v. Clapp, 874 A.2d 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005); see also Redondo Constr. Corp. v. United States, 157 F.3d 1060, 1065 (6th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that, upon filing pursuant to Kentucky's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, a judgment entered by the United States District Court for Puerto Rico was the equivalent of
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Even so, a defendant's procedural due process rights are safeguarded: first, by
being able to defend the claim asserted in the rendering court, and later by being
able to challenge the validity of the judgment or by seeing that the enforcing
state follows the appropriate procedures when satisfying the winning party's
claim.
86
This simple process complies with the "root requirement" of the Due
Process Clause: "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
• . . [being] deprived of any significant property interest., 87 The veracity and
currency of that statement is the lasting legacy of Shaffer's footnote 36. The
section that follows describes how this legacy should embrace foreign arbitral
awards as it does foreign judgments.
V. STRETCHING THE FLEXIBLE STANDARD TO INCLUDE FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not state that it applies to foreign
judgments, and the Supreme Court has not construed it otherwise. In fact, it has
affirmatively stated that "[n]o such right, privilege, or immunity... is conferred
by the Constitution or by any statute of the United States in respect to the judg-
ments of foreign states or nations ... ,88 Accordingly, while U.S. courts must
give full faith and credit to any judgment of a sister state empowered to enter the
judgment,89 they need only recognize the judgment of a foreign court to the ex-
tent that this recognition comports with principles of judicial comity.9° This
section discusses how foreign monetary judgments are enforced in the United
States and argues that foreign arbitral awards should not be treated differently.
a Kentucky judgment, and there is no requirement that a "Kentucky court rubberstamp the foreign
judgment before Kentucky will recognize it as equivalent to a domestic judgment").
86 Newman, supra note 79, at 3. For example, in Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579 (Colo.
1981), the court rejected a due process challenge to the procedures under Colorado's sister-state
judgment act, which allows the entry in Colorado of a sister-state's judgment, without formal
notice or an opportunity to be heard. The court held that the filing of the judgment did not violate
principles of due process because the "basic requirements of notice and hearing" were met by the
state, which issued the original judgment. Gedeon, 630 P.2d at 583.
87 Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 542 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971)).
88 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 321 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring ) ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause,
of course, was inapplicable . . . because the law of a foreign nation, rather than of a sister State,
was at issue .... ). Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does not apply to the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign country judgments.
89 Bakerby Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
90 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 203 (1895). The Supreme Court has defined comity as
"[tihe extent to which the law of one nation.., shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of
another nation." Id. at 163.
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A. Foreign Judgments in the United States
Despite the absence of a constitutional blessing, "American courts [have
recognized]... foreign judgments on a regular basis ... .,,9 This has been pos-
sible because "at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be proceeded by notice and op-
portunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,",92 and, not surpris-
ingly, the United States is not the only country that values these same principles.
The Supreme Court so recognized more than a century ago when it noted that:
[once] there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial
upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary ap-
pearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between
the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and
there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the
system of laws under which it was sitting.... or any other spe-
cial reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full
effect... the merits of the case should not... be tried afresh. 93
Therefore, U.S. courts are fully aware that they are not the only judicial entities
guided by the principles of justice and fairness to the parties. 94
Informed and constrained by this constitutional benchmark, the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign-country judgments is governed by state law.
About half of the states in the United States have adopted the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("Money-Judgments Act"), 95 which is lim-
ited to foreign money judgments and provides that these judgments should be
91 In re Fotochrome Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
92 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (discussing notice as
a requirement of due process); see also Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793 (1996)
(noting that the opportunity to be heard is essential to due process).
93 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 158.
94 As Judge Cardozo said, "We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem
is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120
N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918); see also Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205 ("[W]e are not prepared to hold that
the fact that the [foreign] procedure ... differed from that of our own courts is, of itself, a suffi-
cient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, § 482 cmt. b (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] ("A
court asked to recognize or enforce the judgment of a foreign court must satisfy itself of the essen-
tial fairness of the judicial system under which the judgment was rendered.").
95 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 43 (2002). For a discussion of the Money-Judgments Act see John A.
Spanogle, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the U.S. - A Matter of State Law In Federal
Courts, 13 U.S.-MEx. L. J. 85 (2005).
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treated similarly to sister-state judgments. 96 Just as with judgments issued by
sister states, a defendant may challenge such judgments in the enforcing juris-
diction on the ground that the foreign court that issued the judgment lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. 97
More importantly, the Money-Judgments Act provides that "the foreign
judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state
which is entitled to full faith and credit." 98 In the enforcement context this
means that the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States complies
with the constitutional requirements of due process in the same way that their
domestic counterparts do: pre-judgment in personam jurisdiction over a defen-
dant, and post-judgment attachment jurisdiction over the defendant's assets. 99
As a New York state court recently reasoned while applying New York's ver-
sion of the Money-Judgments Act:
In a proceeding under [New York's version of the Money-
Judgments Act], the judgment creditor does not seek any new
relief against the judgment debtor, but instead merely asks the
court to perform its ministerial function of recognizing the for-
eign country money judgment and converting it into a New
York judgment. Moreover, it is ... likely that any enforcement
96 MONEY-JUDGMENTS AcT, §§ 2-3, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 45-57; see also Soc'y of Lloyd's v.
Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act does not require the judgment creditor to bring an action to recognize
the judgment and another proceeding to enforce it); Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enter.,
Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1990) (holding that under Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money-
Judgments Recognition Act, the judgment of a foreign country was enforceable either by filing a
common law action to enforce the judgment or by the "short cut" filing procedure in the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act). But see Overseas Dev. Bank v. Northmann, 496
N.Y.S.2d 534 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 477 N.E.2d 1086 (N.Y. 1985)
(holding that under New York's version of the Money-Judgments Act, the holder of the foreign
country judgment may not file the judgment directly but must first file a complaint or motion and
obtain a domestic judgment).
97 MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT, § 4(a), 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. at 58-59.
98 MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT, § 3, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. at 49. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:49A-
27 (stating that a copy of any properly authenticated "foreign judgment" may be filed with the
Clerk and the Clerk is required to "treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of
the Superior Court of this State"); see also Enron (Thrace) Exploration & Prod. BV & ECT, 874
A.2d 561, 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (noting that "[b]ecause [in New Jersey] judgments
entitled to full faith and credit may be enforced... without a prior determination [by the court of
first instance] recognizing those judgments, the same procedure is available for judgments of
foreign countries").
99 This would seem to be especially true if a U.S. court requires that a judgment meet the per-
sonal jurisdiction requirements of U.S. law, not the law of the rendering foreign country. See,
e.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying U.S. minimum contacts
inquiry to a judgment rendered abroad and holding that a judgment debtor had sufficient contacts
with West Germany such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a German court did not
offend the U.S. "notions of fair play and substantial justice").
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device ultimately employed by the judgment creditor will [not]
operate against the judgment debtor in personam. Most devices
for the enforcement of money judgments operate in rem against
the real or personal property of the judgment debtor .... 100
100 Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (citations
omitted). Accord Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Iowa 2002)
(holding that a court may recognize and enforce a foreign judgment against a judgment-debtor's
property located in the state in the same manner that it would a judgment of a sister state).
The court in Lenchyshyn went even further by holding that presence of assets or property was not
necessary for a court to confirm a foreign arbitral award.
[E]ven if defendants do not presently have assets in New York, [a creditor]
nevertheless should be granted recognition of the foreign country money
judgment ... and thereby, should have the opportunity to pursue all such en-
forcement steps in futuro, whenever it might appear that defendants are main-
taining assets in New York ....
Lenchyshyn, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 291. Although the court held that the "judgment debtor need not be
subject to personal jurisdiction in New York," it also held that the Due Process Clause of the U. S.
Constitution does not require "that the New York court have a jurisdictional basis for proceeding
against [the] judgment debtor." Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
The constitutionality of this approach is suspect. As this piece has argued, the minimum contacts
test is more flexible at the post-judgment stage. That does not mean that a constitutional analysis
is not required before a court may domesticate a foreign judgment or recognize a foreign arbitral
award. It simply means that when a debtor is not subject to general or specific personal jurisdic-
tion in an enforcing state but happens to have assets in the United States, those assets alone are
enough to satisfy the constitutional inquiry-they provide a court with attachment jurisdiction and
allow it to enforce the judgment/award up to the value of the attached assets. See Park, supra note
1, at 100 & n.99 ("The presence of property would seem relevant in light of the decision in Shaffer
making a distinction between jurisdiction on the merits of a dispute and jurisdiction to enforce [a]
judgment.").
It is hard to see how confirming a foreign judgment (despite the absence of personal or attachment
jurisdiction) so as to allow a party to enforce it infuturo does not run afoul of constitutional due
process. When a U.S. court confirms a foreign judgment, the court enters a judgment in terms
identical to those of the foreign judgment. This judgment has the same force and effect as a val-
idly-rendered judgment of any U.S. court. It may be enforced in any other court in the United
States under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Therefore, although the party has yet to enforce the
judgment against the assets of the debtor, confirming a foreign judgment is tantamount to depriv-
ing the debtor of property. The judgment holder has a legally recognized right over the debtor's
property. As such, the constitutional tenet that a person shall not be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law" should counsel against a state's confirmation of a foreign
judgment in the absence, at the very least, of assets within its jurisdiction.
In short, the same concerns that counsel against allowing a party to enforce an award in the ab-
sence of any nexus to the state should also counsel against confirming an award in a similar con-
text. It is thus not surprising that this rationale has already been rejected by other courts. See,
e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2002) (noting that mere allegations that a party may or will have assets in the forum "is sim-
ply not enough" to confirm an award); Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d
874 (Mich. App. 2003) (holding that in a confirmation and enforcement proceeding, the court
must have jurisdiction over the judgment debtor or his property); cf Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686,
692 (7th Cir. 1995) ("One foreign party can compel another foreign party to arbitrate in the United
[Vol. 109
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Thus, at least in New York, a creditor may enforce a foreign judgment by levy-
ing against whatever assets the defendant may have in New York. '01 "Any other
rule would encourage defendants to transfer property into the state while keep-
ing themselves cautiously beyond personal jurisdiction."' 10 2
B. Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States
In light of this discussion, one should ask: what makes judgments, for-
eign or domestic, different from foreign arbitral awards? If the enforcement of
foreign judgments in the United States can comply with the constitutional re-
quirement of due process by having a fair proceeding in the rendering state and,
at the very least, in rem jurisdiction in the enforcing state, why should U.S.
courts impose a higher threshold on foreign arbitral awards?
10 3
Certainly, there are significant differences between the judgment of a
sister or foreign state and a foreign arbitral award. These differences are not
without legal significance; arbitral awards are not subject to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its implementing statute because the latter apply only to "ju-
dicial proceedings."' 1 4 Given that "[a]rbitration is not a 'judicial proceeding'..
. § 1783 does not apply to arbitration awards."' 1 5 Consequently, perhaps the
most important difference between the two forms of dispute resolution is the
most obvious: arbitrators are not judges in the common law sense of the word.
The Supreme Court has so determined when it noted that:
[A]rbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business world,
since they are not expected to get all their income from their
work deciding cases .... [W]e should.. . be even more scrupu-
lous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges,
States only where the second party has expressly consented to a United States forum or has con-
tacts with that forum sufficient to meet the requirements of personal jurisdiction."). But see Gold-
stein & Bjorklund, supra note 20, at 406-07 ("[T]he award creditor may be inclined to seek en-
forcement in a pro-enforcement jurisdiction where, it has reason to believe, the award debtor may
at some point have assets subject to attachment (if only ... because funds in transit might flow
through a bank account 'situated' in that jurisdiction).") (emphasis added).
101 See, e.g., Lenchyshyn, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 291; Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978). New York is not alone. After Shaffer, state courts throughout the country have regu-
larly applied "quasi in rem" jurisdiction in cases seeking to enforce foreign-state judgments, with-
out requiring that the property be related to the underlying cause of action. See Neuhaus, supra
note 9, at 29 & n.29; see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Crocket Motor Sales, Inc., 293 Ark. 502, 507
(1987).
102 David D. Siegel, 132 SIEGEL'S PRAC. REv. 3 (2003).
103 See Dardana Ltd. v. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F.3d 202, 208 n.13 (2d Cir. 2003).
104 See McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 287 (1984) (quotation omitted)
("[Alrbitration decisions... are not subject to the mandate of § 1738.").
105 Id. at 288.
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since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as
well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review. 106
More simply, unlike judges, arbitrators are not instruments of the state; they are
members and participants of the marketplace.
Like judges, however, arbitrators decide disputes between parties. °7
Indeed, "[i]t is often because they are men of affairs, not apart from but of the
marketplace, that they are effective in their adjudicatory function."'' 0 8 More
importantly, arbitral tribunals can provide litigants with as fair a procedure as
any other court of a foreign country. For example,
[s]hort of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubt-
fully, by panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to what-
ever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their dis-
putes; parties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbi-
tration as they are to specify any other terms in their contract."°9
In other words, in arbitration, contractual liberty is the name of the game.1 o If
the parties agreed to the terms of the arbitral clause, then the arbitral award that
results from a proceeding under those terms and conditions must necessarily be
fair.
Consequently, arbitral proceedings and the resulting arbitral awards are,
at least in theory, just as "fair" as the domestic and foreign judgments rendered
by judges."' Based on this same rationale, the Second Circuit has hinted that
foreign arbitral awards may be enforced as if they were foreign judgments sub-
ject to the enforcing state's Money-Judgments Act. According to the Second
Circuit:
The [New York Money-Judgments Act] does not expressly re-
quire that the judgment be shown to be that of a court, although
courts are referred to elsewhere in the article. There is room to
include such equivalent tribunals as an arbitral panel and an
106 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
107 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) ("By
agreeing to arbitrate a... claim.. . a party does not forgo ... [its] substantive rights...; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.") (citation omitted).
108 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
109 Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyons & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
110 Park, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that "business managers generally assume the risk that
arbitrators may 'get it wrong' on the substance of the dispute but do not bargain for denial of
fundamental due process").
I Although some may disagree with this general statement, the truth is that no adjudicative
system is perfect. See Park, supra note 1, at 129 & nn.217-18 (admitting that, in some instances,
"arbitration can become the instrument of injustice").
[Vol. 109
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administrative type agency, if their determinations otherwise
satisfy the criteria set forth in [the Money-Judgments Act]. It
may be that the determination emerges from such a foreign tri-
bunal with the same status there as a judicial judgment has, and
without having to be converted into such a judgment. If that is
so, it should not be indispensable that such a conversion occur
before New York recognizes the determination. 12
That being the case, the spirit, if not the language, of both Hilton and Shaffer's
footnote 36 should apply with equal force to foreign arbitral awards. 13 The
presence of property alone, however unrelated to the cause of action it may be,
can and should supply the jurisdictional basis in an action to enforce arbitral
awards under the New York Convention. "14
To rule otherwise would mean that foreign judgments are to be enforced
more liberally than foreign arbitral awards. That result could lead to a de facto
resurgence of the double exequatur problem that the New York Convention
tried to eliminate.115 In fact, at least one commentator has already asked
whether "successful parties in foreign arbitrations [should] think about turning
their awards into foreign judgments abroad, before trying to enforce them in the
United States as awards .... 16 Under the current state of affairs, the answer,
112 Dardana Ltd. v. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F.3d 202, 208 n.13 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting David D.
Siegel, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301 at 541 (McKinney 1997)).
113 Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person"? Does it Matter?: Personal Jurisdiction,
Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 115, 179
(2001) ("The issue in such a case is not whether the defendant possesses 'minimum contacts'
within the jurisdiction of the enforcing court, but rather whether the defendant had such contacts
within the jurisdiction of the court that issued the judgment."). But see S.I. Strong, Invisible Bar-
riers to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 479,
489 (2004) (discrediting the validity of footnote 36 because footnotes "are not the most persuasive
location in a judicial opinion" and arguing that "actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards are not
necessarily analogous to actions to enforce ... judgments of sister states").
114 Dardana, 317 F.3d at 208. But see S.I. Strong, supra note 113, at 489 (arguing that attach-
ment based solely on the presence of property in the state is unconstitutional).
15 Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713 n.2 (2d Cir. 1987)
("[T]he [New York] Convention does not apply to the enforcement of judgments that confirm
foreign arbitral awards."); Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices Inc., 489 F.2d 1313,
1318 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The Convention... in no way... prevent[s] states from enforcing foreign
money judgments, whether those judgments are rendered in the enforcement of an arbitration
award or otherwise."); Ocean Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals & Alloys, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d
245, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("The [New York] Convention defenses simply do not apply to [a]...
proceeding seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if that judgment was
based on a foreign arbitral award.").
116 Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitral Awards, 229
N.Y.L.J. 3 col.1 (April 30, 2003); see Ocean Warehousing, 157 F. Supp. 2d 245 (enforcing a
Dutch judgment based on a foreign arbitral award under the Money-Judgments Act even though
the judgment debtor claimed that the court could not enforce the underlying arbitration award
under the New York Convention because the agreement to arbitrate was not in writing); cf A.
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unfortunately, appears to be yes. But should it? The answer to this question, in
turn, must be no. As discussed above, such practical obstacles could hinder the
convenience of international arbitration by undermining the essence of the float-
ing awards concept. And, as the next section discusses, the presence of assets
alone should be enough to enforce even a foreign arbitral award.
VI. A FLEXIBLE, REASONABLE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
Of course, saying that foreign arbitral awards must be treated the same
as foreign or domestic judgments during post-judgment proceedings begs a
critical question: is the practice of enforcing these judgments based on the pres-
ence of assets alone even constitutional? Could not it be argued that courts
should require that the subject assets be related to the underlying cause of action
before enforcing a sister state or foreign judgment? In short, what exactly did
the Shaffer Court say in footnote 36, and did the Court mean what it said?
Besides dropping footnote 36, the Shaffer Court did not really provide
that much guidance as to whether the attached property or assets in an enforce-
ment proceeding need to be related to the underlying cause of action. Two re-
cent Court of Appeals opinions have not helped clarify the matter. Although the
Ninth Circuit in Glencore Grain referred to Shaffer's footnote 36 when it rea-
soned that relatedness is not a prerequisite to enforcement,11 7 the Fourth Circuit
in Base Metal relied on different parts of the Supreme Court opinion in Shaffer
when it held the exact opposite. 11 8 Neither court explained with clarity why the
von Mehren & Trautman, Recognitions of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and Suggested Ap-
proach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, 1695-96 (1968) (arguing that in order to avoid lack of uniformity
among states, the standards for recognizing and enforcing foreign country judgments need to be
federalized).
Moreover, any distinction between foreign and domestic judgments may violate Article III of the
New York Convention. Article 3 requires adhering countries not to impose "substantially more
onerous conditions ... on the recognition or enforcement of [foreign] arbitral awards.., than are
imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." New York Convention,
supra note 2, at art. III. As a practitioner noted more than twenty years ago, if a domestic arbitral
award may be made into a domestic judgment and, consequently, be entitled to full faith and
credit, while a judgment based on a foreign award is entitled only to comity, "[i]t would seem that
this distinction might have a significantly discriminating effect upon foreign awards." Hans
Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 711
(1983).
117 See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1127
(9th Cir. 2002).
118 Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir.
2002). The court held that:
[When the property which serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely
unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action, the presence of property alone will
not support jurisdiction. While "the presence of defendant's property in a
State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State,
[Vol. 109
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presence of unrelated assets in the forum state is, or is not, sufficient to give fair
warning to the award debtor such that he could reasonably anticipate being
haled into court in the United States to defend against an enforcement proceed-
ing.'1 9
The discussion that follows picks-up where these two most recent opin-
ions left off. It explains why relatedness to the cause of action, or a sort of "spe-
cific-jurisdiction" analysis, need not be applied in a proceeding to enforce a
foreign arbitral award. The main point that this section makes is that relatedness
is a not a good proxy for fair warning. Instead, courts should consider purpose-
fulness of the presence of the assets within their jurisdiction when deciding
whether an enforcement action may be pursued in its jurisdiction. 120
A. Assets in the United States
As a preliminary matter, there can be no doubt that, before a court can
enforce a foreign arbitral award, there must be "something" within its jurisdic-
tion with which to satisfy that award. 121 That is to say, to be constitutionally
fair, a floating award must be anchored in the United States. Federal law, after
all, "does not provide federal courts with power over all persons throughout the
world who have entered into an arbitration agreement covered by the [New
York] Convention."' 122 Or, stated otherwise, "neither the [New York] Conven-
and the litigation" when those "other ties" do not exist, jurisdiction is not rea-
sonable.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
119 Similarly, commentators have brushed aside the issue without discussing whether related-
ness to the cause of action should be taken into consideration at the time of enforcement of an
award. See, e.g., supra notes 102, 113.
120 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (noting that the "fair warning"
requirement in pre-judgment actions is satisfied if there is a finding of both purposefulness of
defendant's activities in the forum and relatedness of those activities to the cause of action).
121 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980) ("mhe Due Process Clause 'does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment . . . against an individual or corporate
defendant with which the state has no contact, ties, or relations."') (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). But see Pelagia Ivanova, Note, Forum Non Conveniens
and Personal Jurisdiction: Procedural Limitations on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Under the New York Convention, 83 B.U.L. REv, 899, 916 (2003) (arguing that "[i]t
would be more reasonable to abide by the jurisdictional finding of the arbitral situs: as long as a
court finds jurisdiction over the defendant at such situs, the forum asked to affirm the award
should not be concerned with a separate finding of jurisdiction," but admitting that "such a rule
will inevitably face much opposition on constitutional grounds").
Of course, this "something" does not have to be assets. A court can enforce the award if it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
122 Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd. v. Saudi Chartering S.A., 622 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The Southern District of New York said it best when it noted that the FAA:
does not.., give the court power over all persons throughout the world who
have entered into an arbitration agreement covered by the [New York] Con-
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tion nor its implementing legislation removed the district courts' obligation to
find jurisdiction over the defendant [or his property] in suits to confirm [and
enforce] arbitral awards.' 23
The practical implication that an award has to be enforced against
"something" has a constitutional undertone: fair warning. 124 The Second Circuit
summarized these fair warning concerns by way of an example when it dis-
missed an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award on forum non conveniens
grounds: 
2 5
vention. Some basis must be shown, whether arising from the [award
debtor's] residence, his conduct, his consent, the location of his property or
otherwise, to justify his being subject to the court's power.
Id.
123 Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2002).
124 "The Due Process Clause requires that individuals have 'fair warning that a particular activ-
ity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."' Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472
(citation omitted).
M2 Quite inexplicably, the Second Circuit never reached the question of whether it had jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. See Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Noftogaz
of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 497 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court failed to address the juris-
dictional issue raised by the defendants, but stating that "it was acceptable for the district court to
do so").
Courts of Appeals are split on whether courts must decide jurisdictional issues, such as personal
jurisdiction, before ruling on forum non conveniens. Compare Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 497-98
(holding that courts may decide a forum non conveniens issue before deciding the question of
personal jurisdiction), and In re Papandreu, 139 F.3d 247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998), with Malaysia
Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a court must
first address the question of personal jurisdiction before dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds). See also Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir.
2005) (per curiam); Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001), affd in part, cert.
dismissed in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003); Kamel v. Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 1997).
The very goal of forum non conveniens suggests that a court cannot by-pass a jurisdictional in-
quiry by dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds. As the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit noted,
Forum non coveniens allows a court (with jurisdiction and proper venue) to
decline the exercise of its jurisdiction in favor of letting another court (also
with jurisdiction and venue) hear the case. In this way, jurisdiction - both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction - is a sine qua non for forum non
coveniens.
Malaysia Int'l Shipping, 436 F.3d at 361 (citations omitted). Moreover, given the nature of en-
forcement proceedings and the idea of floating awards embraced by the New York Convention,
there is a good argument to be made that Monde Re was wrongly decided, not only because it by-
passed the jurisdictional inquiry, but also because it applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens
in the context of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The discussion so far would suggest that
there is absolutely no room for that doctrine in that context. See Melton v. Oy Nautor Ab, No.
CV-96-00492-DLJ, 1998 WL 613798, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1998) (Tashima, J., dissenting)
(arguing that forum non conveniens does not apply to proceedings to enforce arbitral awards). If a
court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, or even attachment jurisdiction, the court must
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Forcing the recognition and enforcement in Mexico . . . in a
case of an arbitral award made in Indonesia, where the parties,
the underlying events and the award have no connection to
Mexico, may be highly inconvenient overall and might chill in-
ternational trade if the parties had no recourse but to litigate, at
any cost, enforcement of arbitral awards in a petitioner's chosen
forum. The Convention was intended to promote the enforce-
ment of international arbitration so that businesses would not be
wary of entering into international contracts. It would be coun-
terproductive if such an application of the Convention gave
businesses a new cause for concern.1
26
A key feature of the Second Circuit's fact pattern is that the parties had no con-
nection to the enforcing state. This would essentially deprive them of any no-
tice that they could ever be brought to that jurisdiction in a post-award proceed-
ing. According to the views set forth in this piece, the Second Circuit's con-
cerns are entirely unobjectionable.
B. Relatedness as Proxy for Fair Warning
Nevertheless, relatedness to the cause of action is an inadequate proxy
for fair warning in post-judgment attachment actions because it does not further
the legitimate expectations of the parties. At the time of collecting on a debt, a
creditor does not expect to have to distinguish between assets that are related to
the cause of action and those that are not. By the same token, an award debtor
would be hard-pressed to claim that he expects related assets to be more vulner-
able to attachment jurisdiction than unrelated assets during an enforcement pro-
ceeding. 127 To both parties, the importance of these assets is not defined in
terms of relatedness; it is defined in terms of value. Not surprisingly, that is also
the only thing that matters to a winning party who, through an enforcement pro-
ceeding, is going after those assets. This, in turn, should be the only thing that
matters to a court. Once a court or tribunal has determined that one party owes
enforce the award. And, assuming that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does apply, the court
must find that the forum is convenient.
Be that as it may, it seems that the holding of the district court in Monde Re would not have been
the same if the defendant had assets in the United States. See Monagasque De Reassurances
S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 158 F. Supp. 2d 377, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dis-
cussing in passing that "it is not clear that [the defendant] has any assets in the United States from
which Monde Re could recover"); see also Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 499 (claiming that "the motiva-
tion of Monde Re for bringing its enforcement proceeding in the United States is not apparent").
126 Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 496-97 (citation omitted).
127 Cf RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8 (1982) ("A court may exercise
jurisdiction to seize property whose situs is in the state.., in an action concerning a claim against
the owner of the property if: . . . [t]he action is to enforce a judgment against the owner of the
property.").
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money to another party, there is no logical reason to require that the debt be paid
with moneys that had been earmarked for that purpose.
A relatedness requirement also introduces unnecessary uncertainty and
fosters perverse incentives that hinder the goals of the Due Process Clause. As
the Supreme Court has noted:
[T]he Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly administra-
tion of laws" . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their...
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that con-
duct will and will not render them liable to suit.
128
Despite this admonition, the relatedness requirement embraced by the Fourth
Circuit in Base Metal would allow courts to look the other way and allow an
award debtor to structure his conduct so as to avoid the enforcement of the
award. That is, to the extent that a relatedness requirement leads to a predict-
able result, it would likely be in the context of a recalcitrant debtor attempting to
place his assets out of the reach of the award creditor. This form of forum
shopping protects the expectations of these debtors; however, allowing parties to
hide their unrelated assets in the United States ignores the legitimate expecta-
tions of international players who see the United States as a fair forum and ex-
pect their debts to be paid. A better rule would be to put parties on notice that
any and all assets present in the United States are subject to attachment jurisdic-
tion in an enforcement action, regardless of whether the assets are related to the
underlying cause of action. 29
By making the United States a safe haven for unrelated assets, the relat-
edness requirement also forces the parties to answer two equally difficult ques-
tions that are prone to dilatory litigation tactics. First, what is the cause of ac-
tion about? Second, are the assets related to the cause of action? One can easily
imagine parties trying to define the underlying dispute in such a way as to make
it appear "related" or "unrelated" to the assets at stake. 130 This, in turn, high-
lights the difficulty behind requiring that the assets be related to the cause of
action: assets are fungible. Very often, it can be nearly impossible to establish
the relationship between the assets present in the United States and the underly-
ing cause of action that resulted in the award.
128 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (internal citations
omitted).
129 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 94, § 481 cmt. h ("An action to enforce a
judgment may usually be brought wherever property of the defendant is found, without any neces-
sary connection between the underlying action and the property .... ").
130 Cf Cameron-Brown Co. v. Daves, 350 S.E.2d 111, 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (noting, in a
pre-judgment proceeding, that although one party claimed that the assets were "intimately related"
to the cause of action, "the record [did] not disclose any such relationship").
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Admittedly, establishing relatedness between the cause of action and the
assets within the United States would be easier in the case of tangible property.
Despite this minor advantage, courts should not draw the line between tangibles
and intangibles.'3 3 Imagine a case in which the cause of action is a breach of
contract for the sales of goods and that the goods are in a U.S. territory. In such
a case, the goods are, no doubt, related to the cause of action and the relatedness
inquiry appears utterly workable. Nevertheless, any distinction between tangi-
bles and intangibles could provide an incentive to the award debtors to turn tan-
gible property into intangible assets and avoid an easy relatedness inquiry. 
1 32
C. Purposefulness as Proxy for Fair Warning
The bottom line is that a better proxy for fair warning in enforcement
proceedings lies in a determination of the purposefulness of the presence of as-
sets within the United States. As Justice Stevens said in his concurrence in
Shaffer,
The requirement of fair notice ... includes fair warning that a
particular activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a
foreign state. If I ... acquire real estate or open a bank account
in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise
its power over my property .... As a matter of international
law, that suggestion might be acceptable because a foreign in-
vestment is sufficiently unusual to make it appropriate to re-
quire the investor to study the ramifications of his decision. 1
33
In other words, once the party places assets in the United States, he knowingly
assumes the risk that those assets may be subject to attachment in an enforce-
ment proceeding.
This is especially true in the context of international arbitration where a
party that agrees to arbitrate a dispute is on notice that if he loses, the winning
131 But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (advising that
the Court should draw a line between tangible and intangible property because "[i]n the case of
real property" or "other forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located...
preservation of the common-law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction... would avoid the uncer-
tainty of the general International Shoe standard without significant cost to traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice") (internal quotation and citations omitted).
132 The Supreme Court often takes into account the adverse effect that a jurisdictional finding
may have on what would otherwise be desirable behavior. For example, in Kulko the Court noted
that a finding of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based on a divorce agreement
that allowed the children to visit their mother in the state "would discourage parents from entering
into reasonable visitation agreements." Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978). There-
fore, although not strictly part of a jurisdictional inquiry, U.S. courts should take into considera-
tion the effects that a jurisdictional distinction between tangible and intangible assets may have on
the actions of the parties to litigation.
133 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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party will try to satisfy the award with his assets wherever they are found. 134 A
debtor knows that he must pay and that, to the extent that he resists, he should
expect that he will be forced to pay. In an enforcement proceeding, the power
of the state is based on the well-established principle of fairness that the Su-
preme Court in Shaffer embraced without hesitation: "a debtor [should not be
able to avoid] paying his obligations by removing his property to a State in
which his creditor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him."'' 35
Here the most difficult question will arise when dealing with intangible
assets and attempting to determine where they are "located."' 136 One of the fac-
tors that a court could consider when determining purposefulness is the duration
of the assets' presence within the jurisdiction. For example, if the assets have
been in the jurisdiction for many years, it would be hard for the award debtor to
show that he had not purposefully placed them there or that she did not know
that the law of the state considered them as being located within the jurisdiction
of the state. 1
37
Allowing for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards against unre-
lated assets will not flood the dockets of U.S. courts with international dis-
putes. 138 The same basic constitutional tenets that protect an award debtor from
being haled into a forum in which he does not have assets, or any other kind of
connection, would also serve judicial economy by allowing courts to quickly
134 A similar argument is made in the context of sovereign states. The weight of authority
holds that a foreign state's agreement to arbitrate in one New York Convention signatory state is
an implied waiver of immunity from actions to confirm and enforce a resulting arbitral award in
other Convention signatories. See, e.g., Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH v. Navimpex Centrala Na-
vala, 989 F.2d 572, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1993); M.B.L. Int'l Contrs., Inc. v. Republic of Trinidad &
Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1989); Liberian Easter Timber Corp. v. Gov't of Republic of
Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), afftd, 854 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1987); Verlinden
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affid on other grounds,
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
135 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210. Accord David H. Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 997, 1008 (1977-78) (arguing that a
flexible understanding of the minimum contacts test when applied to enforcement proceeding is
"pragmatically necessary if judgment debtors are to be prevented from shielding their assets from
judgment creditors by shipping the assets to a state with which the underlying litigation had no
prior connection").
136 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47 (1958) ("The basis of [in rem] jurisdiction is the
presence of the subject property within the... State. Tangible property poses no problem for the
application of this rule, but the situs of intangibles is often a matter of controversy.").
137 Cf. Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Md. 1992) ("It is one
thing to say that merely maintaining a bank account in the forum should not subject a defendant to
a personal judgment of a potentially limitless amount; it is quite another to say that the mainte-
nance of that account should never by itself subject the defendant to a judgment... limited to the
monies that he has purposefully deposited in the forum.").
138 Cf Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC Navokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208,
216 (4th Cir. 2002) ("It is not clear why the limited resources of the federal courts should be spent
resolving disputes between two foreign corporations with little or no connection to our country.").
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dismiss actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards where such connections do not
already exist. As one Court of Appeals noted in a somewhat related matter,
"[tihere will be no vast migration of foreign arbitration disputes to the United
States... unless the defendant is already in some way connected to this coun-
try.'
39
Although the suggested approach relies heavily on the power test, 4 it
does not do so at the expense of the reasonableness test. As discussed above,
the minimum contacts test is not divorced from the constantly-evolving eco-
nomic realities that may reduce or increase the burden on a defendant. In fact,
"[tihe limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause, in its role
as guarantor against inconvenient litigation, have been substantially relaxed
over the years.' 4' And, if the past is any indication of the future, this trend is
bound to continue. More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court so heralded
when it stated that:
[t]oday many commercial transactions touch two or more States
and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With
this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great
increase in the amount of business conducted . . . across state
lines. At the same time modern transportation and communica-
tion has made it much less burdensome for a party sued to de-
fend himself in a State where he engages in economic activ-
ity. 142
The same, of course, holds true today in an age that is defined not so much by
the nationalization of commerce but by its globalization. Modern systems of
transportation and communication have lessened the burden on litigants who
may need to litigate in a foreign forum.
Modern litigants have also changed. Parties whose awards are subject
to the New York Convention are generally not mom-and-pop companies. They
are by definition "international," and their deals have some international com-
ponent to them. To these parties, often multinational companies, the litigation
expense that may result from being "haled into U.S. courts" is not really a bur-
den, it is part of doing business. 143 The idea of a foreign party being "haled into
139 Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 1995).
140 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[E]very state possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."); see also discussion supra Part
Il.
141 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
142 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
143 Cf Park, supra note 1, at 83 (advocating for a reform of the FAA that clearly distinguishes
between international and domestic arbitration and noting that "[d]iverse cases call for different
levels of judicial review, with the least interventionist role assumed in arbitration between sophis-
ticated business entities from different countries").
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court" and unfairly burdened with having to defend himself against an enforce-
ment proceeding has a hollow ring to it in the international arbitration context.
144
What is more, this burden on the award-debtor must be considered in
light of other relevant factors such as the nature of the action.145  At the en-
forcement stage, the court is dealing with parties that were presumably able to
litigate the basis of their claim; they already had their day in court. 146 All that
remains to be done is "cashing" the award and satisfying a debt.147 The process,
as explained above, is relatively simple. To the extent that the losing party
claims that the award should not be enforced, his defenses are limited to the
seven grounds set forth in the New York Convention. 48 Limited defenses, in
turn, translate into limited expenses. And, if jurisdiction is based on assets lo-
cated in the jurisdiction, this will also translate into limited exposure to liability.
The fact that there may be other jurisdictions where the award creditor
may attempt to enforce the award should not provide U.S. courts with an escape
hatch to dismiss enforcement actions in the name of judicial economy. 149 If
144 Cf Neuhaus, supra note 9, at 28 ("Once you have gone to the trouble and expense of obtain-
ing an arbitral award, and once the respondent has failed to fulfill its obligation to pay the award,
shouldn't you be able to take the award anywhere you can find assets and seize them?"); David D.
Siegel, For Suit on Foreign Country Arbitral Award, Need There be Personal Jurisdiction in New
York, or Does Property Suffice?, 132 SIEGELL'S PRAC. REv. 3 (2003) (same). But see Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1986) (noting that the "unique burdens placed
upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in
assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national
borders").
145 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 ("mhe burden on the defendant.., will in an
appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors ....").
146 Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying and Coherent Theory of In Personam
Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 97, 115 (1992) (noting that the court at a post-judgment
proceeding "is not assessing liability and measuring compensation but merely making property
available to satisfy the claim [because] the assessing and measuring is done by a judgment-issuing
court with" in personam jurisdiction).
147 CME Media Enters. B.V. v. Zelezny, No. 01 Civ. 1733 (DC), 2001 WL 1035138, at * 3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2001) ("Minimum contacts are not required because an arbitration panel with
personal jurisdiction over the defendant has already adjudicated claims and determined that de-
fendant is a debtor of the plaintiff; the purpose of the proceeding is merely to collect on that
debt.") (citing Shaffer's footnote 36); accord Am. Constr. Mach. & Equip. Corp. v. Mechanized
Constr. of Pakistan Ltd., No. 85 Civ. 3765, 1986 WL 2973 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 1986) ("As a
preliminary matter, it is not clear that 'contacts' between the United States and the defendant are
required where the judgment sought is simply the enforcement of an award rendered in a foreign
jurisdiction where the defendant had the opportunity to appear and contest the entry of judgment.
148 See Halverson, supra note 113, at 178-79 ("What should matter in the enforcement context
is whether the award is valid under the criteria set forth in the Convention and whether there are
assets of the foreign state in the United States against which to enforce the award.").
149 Id. at 176-77 ("Since the arbitration exception involves actions to enforce arbitral awards
rendered elsewhere rather than an action to litigate the underlying dispute, the plaintiff in such a
suit should be able to enforce the award wherever the foreign state's assets may be found.").
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anything, this should counsel in favor of enforcement of the arbitral award. As
the Supreme Court noted in a case dealing with a foreign defendant,
[c]ourts [must] take into consideration the interests of the "sev-
eral States," in addition to the forum State, in the efficient judi-
cial resolution of the dispute and the advancement of substan-
tive policies .... [T]his advice calls for a court to consider the.
• .policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion of jurisdiction by [a U.S.] court. 150
Thus, U.S. courts must take into account the interests of other nations when
confronted with an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award. A key factor guid-
ing their decision must be the undisputed fact that what makes international
arbitration practical is that there may be multiple enforcement proceedings in
multiple jurisdictions against the recalcitrant debtor. The New York Convention
envisioned that there would be more than one forum where the award could be
enforced. As such, it left the determination as to where such proceedings should
be brought to the best judgment of the winning party, not to the courts. Simply
put, judicial economy should not trump the right of the award creditor to enforce
the award.
At the end of the day, it is in the United States' best interest to enforce
arbitral awards based on the presence of assets alone (however unrelated to the
underlying cause of action they may be). As explained above, the New York
Convention promotes the enforcement of international awards because the cer-
tainty of knowing that a valid award floats and can be enforced against the as-
sets of a recalcitrant debtor actually reduces the concerns of entering into inter-
national contracts. International firms may think twice before entering into in-
ternational transactions if they think that assets present in the United States may
be off limits. This doomsday scenario has already been described by those who
claim that "[w]ithout the assurance of enforcement by a national court in whose
territory an award debtor's property is located, international commercial arbitra-
tion simply will not work."' 1
51
VII. FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Shaffer's footnote 36 should have settled the matter of whether, during a
post-judgment proceeding to enforce an arbitral award, there needs to be a nexus
between the party's assets and the underlying cause of action. The courts that so
far have managed not to follow the spirit and letter of footnote 36 have done so
to the detriment of the international system established by the New York Con-
vention.
150 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
151 W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
107 (1992).
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Shaffer's footnote 36 is certainly not the final word on the jurisdictional
issues that a party may have to confront during an enforcement proceeding in
the United States. The field is ripe with additional questions and problems. For
example, assuming that the Supreme Court or another jurisdiction adopts the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Glencore Grain, the question would still re-
main whether an award could only be enforced up to the value of the assets that
served as the basis of the court's jurisdiction. Although, at first blush, it would
appear that a court's power to enforce an award should be limited to the value of
the assets present within its jurisdiction for the reasons discussed above, the
Ninth Circuit questioned the validity of this assumption and expressly declined
to rule on it. 152
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has recently questioned whether foreign
companies are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment. 153 According
to the court, "although courts often assume the minimum contacts test applies to
suits against foreign 'persons,' that assumption appears never to have been chal-
lenged."' 54 This is not the first time that the D.C. Circuit has intimated that it
would be willing to entertain an argument challenging this assumption. Al-
though it is hard to tell how the court will rule when this issue arises, based on
the context in which the statement was made, it appears that the D.C. Circuit is
ready to take the next step and hold that foreign companies are not "persons" for
due process purposes.
Finally, another question that needs to be resolved is whether the pres-
ence of assets is even necessary to confirm a foreign arbitral award. In other
words, can a court properly confirm an award so that a party may try to enforce
it in futuro? Although the D.C. Circuit has noted that this would be possible in
the case of foreign states (who are not subject to the requirements and protection
of the Due Process Clause), other circuits in the United States have not ad-
dressed the issue. Similarly, many commentators have assumed, without dis-
cussion, that this would be a constitutionally permissible course of action. 155
Ultimately, it could be said that all cases are alike and all cases are dis-
tinguishable. Yet, in whatever form and under whichever fact pattern they arise,
the truth is that all of these issues require more attention from the judiciary,
practitioners, and commentators alike. Perhaps a clear principle of law will
evolve from such a concerted exercise.
152 Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 n.5
(9th Cir. 2002).
153 TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
154 Id. at 302 n.* (raising the question of whether the minimum contacts test applies to foreign
"persons").
155 See, e.g., Goldstein & Bjorklund, supra note 20, at 406-07 (noting that an "award creditor
may... seek enforcement in a pro-enforcement jurisdiction where... the award debtor may at
some point have assets subject to attachment").
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